








Free-riding or Internalizing? An Opportunistic 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3328 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Free-riding or Internalizing? An Opportunistic 





The aim of the paper is to analyze a model of local public good provision with positive 
interjurisdictional spillovers comparing decentralized and centralized system. As in the recent 
Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism (Seabright 1996; Lockwood 2002, 
2006; Besley and Coate 2003; Weingast 2009), we also adopt a political economy approach, 
assuming different behaviours of political leaders (Leviathan and non-Leviathan). The main 
contribution of the paper is to consider two relevant aspects neglected by the political 
economy models: the size of local jurisdictions and the explicit definition of the rent-seeking 
behaviour. Moreover, modelling interregional externalities as a mechanism contributing to 
lowering the production cost of the public good in each region, a different trade-off - from the 
traditional and new theory of fiscal federalism - is proposed in order to compare decentralized 
versus centralized solution: the gains from internalizing externalities and the losses of 
freeriding advantages, which may differ with regional size and preferences for the public 
good. Given this general framework, the convenience of decentralization versus centralization 
mainly depends on the interaction among these factors: i) the free-riding gains exploiting 
positive externalities; ii) the gains of internalizing externalities; iii) the degree of preferences 
heterogeneity; iv) the implicit transfers (“cross subsidization”) across different regions. To 
summarize, from a positive viewpoint, decentralization should not be necessarily pursued 
only in the absence of externalities, but also with high spillovers. The key insight of this result 
is represented by different size of regions, which may determine an asymmetry among 
citizens’ responses concerning the best institutional setting. 
JEL-Code: H730, H770, H410, D720. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
According to the traditional theory of fiscal federalism (Tiebout 1956; Buchanan 1965; Oates 
1972), decentralized tiers of government found their primary role in the provision of efficient 
levels  of  “local”  public  goods  –  that  is,  public  goods  whose  consumption  was  limited 
primarily  to  their  own  constituencies.  Where  spillovers  benefits  across  jurisdictions 
accompanied  outputs  of  local  public  goods,  appropriate  unit  subsides  would  encourage 
decentralized  authorities  to  extend  outputs  to  efficient  levels.  Indeed,  under  the  First 
Generation  Theory  (FGT)  of  fiscal  federalism,  the  trade off  between  centralization  and 
decentralization of certain public activities concerns, on the one hand, the inefficiencies under 
centralized  provision  of  public  services  stemming  from  more  uniform  outputs  that  fail to 
reflect divergences in local tastes and conditions versus, on the other hand, inefficiencies in 
local provision resulting from the failure to internalize interjurisdictional externalities (Oates 
2005). In the latter case, the solution for decentralized provision is stronger only whether 
spillovers effects across local jurisdictions are relatively small and the variation in efficient 
levels of local outputs is relatively large. 
More recently, new insights have emerged from the Second Generation Theory (SGT) of 
fiscal federalism (Seabright 1996; Qian and Weingast 1997; Lockwood 2002, 2006; Besley 
and Coate 2003; Weingast 2009),
1 which focuses on a quite different   with respect to the one 
crucial for the FGT   trade off: the centralization versus decentralization issue is now based 
on the comparison between the higher degree of policies coordination under centralization 
(which  should  guarantee  the  internalization  of  externalities),  and  the  higher  degree  of 
accountability  and  control  of  local  politicians  by  citizens  under  decentralization  (which 
should  guarantee  more  sensitivity  of  outcomes  to  local  preferences).  Thus,  improved 
accountability   as a result of decentralization   must be set against any externalities which 
arise  from  spillovers  between  localities  (Seabright  1996).  Actually,  this  trade off  is  in  a 
somewhat similar spirit to their earlier counterparts since, as Besley and Coate (2003) pointed 
out, “the key insight remains that heterogeneity and spillovers are correctly at the heart of the 
debate about the gains from centralization”, but for different reasons than those suggested in 
the existing literature.  
In general, to address the choice between centralized and decentralized provision of public 
goods, political economy studies model   explicitly or implicitly   the government behaviour, 
where differentiated (and possibly conflicting) objective functions between decision makers 
and citizens are usually assumed.
2 In Edwards and Keen (1996) and Seabright (1996), for 
example, government is modelled as a Leviathan.
3 In this case, politicians aim at applying 
taxes (or at having financing sources) that best maximize their rents, obtaining all potential 
benefits that arise from providing services whose value (in aggregate) is less than the amount 
of taxes received by their communities (Liberati 2010).  
Following this line of research, we also adopt a political economy approach
4 assuming 
different  behaviours  of  political  leaders  to  look  at  the  trade off  between  centralized  and 
decentralized provision of local public goods with spillovers linked thereto. In detail, two 
                                                 
1 See Oates (2005) for a survey.   
2 A central tenet of the Public Choice approach is the view that public decision makers are utility maximizers 
with their own objective functions. Budget maximization is taken here to serve as a proxy for a variety of 
objectives including enhancement of power and influence, large staffs, and higher salaries. 
3 See also Alesina and Spolaore (1997); Bolton and Roland (1997); Cremer and Palfrey (1996). 
4 As argued by Lockwood (2006), “By a political economy approach, I mean a systematic attempt to model the 
behaviour of government   whether at the national or local level   taking into account institutions and processes, 
such as elections and legislatures, which determine the choice of fiscal policy in practice”.   3 
specifications  of  politicians’  behaviour  are  studied:  one  adopting  a  “full  recovery  costs” 
(FRC) strategy, setting taxation equal to the cost of providing the public good, without any 
additional gains; one implementing a “Leviathan” strategy, charging a higher tax than the 
production cost in order to get an extra rent. To some extent, the former is quite similar to the 
standard  benevolent  government;  while,  the  latter  exploits  their  residents,  imposing  taxes 
above the benefits they get. From an analytical point of view, the innovation of the paper is to 
describe the detail of the representatives’ opportunistic behaviour in the legislature through an 
alternative specification concerning the budget constraint definition which includes an extra 
rent when the decision maker is Leviathan. Thus, we directly model a “rent equation” to 
represent the additional gain of rent seeking politicians.  
The second contribution of the paper is to model positive external spillovers linked to the 
provision of local public goods in a different way as usual (Gilbert and Picard 1996; Conley 
and Dix 1999; Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003; Dur and Staal 2008). Indeed, positive 
externalities are treated as a mechanism contributing to lowering the production cost of the 
public good in each  region. Examples of local  public goods providing  positive spillovers 
which reduce the cost of public good provision for other regions are environment quality 
protection or local infrastructures.  
In this vein, we introduce them into the unitary cost of public good production, which 
negatively depends on the amount of the public good provided in all regions. In general, the 
cost  of  local  public  good  provision  is  assumed  to  be  decreasing  if  intergiurisdictional 
externalities are large and positive, since their total effect is over the whole national territory 
and independent of the number of regions in which the territory is divided. The main point 
remains,  as  suggested  by  Seabright  (1996),  that  the  “choice  between  centralized  and 
decentralized  forms  of  government  need  not  always  be  made  once  and  for  all,  but  can 
sometimes be undertaken on a case by case basis if it is possible to estimate some of the 
relevant variables (such as the size of the spillovers)”.  
Given this general framework, we propose a different trade off to compare centralized with 
decentralized solution: it is between the gains from internalizing externalities and the losses of 
free riding  advantages,  which  may  vary  with  size  and  preferences  of  local  jurisdictions. 
Indeed, the issue of size
5 is relevant since it allows a range of different public policies under 
decentralization or centralization, given the degree of intergiurisdictional externalities and the 
policy makers’ behaviour.  
Disparity in size may be a source of inefficiency itself, exacerbating the loss that each 
region suffers as a consequence of non cooperative behaviour. Surprisingly, the role of size in 
strategic  tax  and  spending  design  has  received  little  explicit  attention.
6  The  Kanbur  and 
Keen’s (1993) contribution represents an exception as it particularly focuses on the role of 
country size to capture some of the central features of the interaction between national tax 
systems in an integrated world. The crucial point of the KK’s model is that the form of the 
home country’s best response correspondence critically depends on its relative size. In other 
words, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the responses   in choosing their own level 
of taxation   of small and large countries. Markusen and Wigle (1989) also focus on the role 
of size, showing that optimal tariffs vary with the country size (in particular, the optimal tariff 
                                                 
5 The preliminary issue here is to identify the meaning of size. Indeed, size can be measured in terms of land or 
population (King 1984), and also considering the public budget of government. We define size in terms of 
population, as in most of the literature of fiscal federalism (Buchanan 1965; Oates 1972). 
6 Besley and Coate (2003) consider regions only different in preferences   not in size   assuming a continuum of 
citizens  with a  mass of unity.  Analogously,  Lockwood (2002) describes regions populated by a number of 
identical individuals with a population size normalized to unity; Gilbert and Picard (1996) assume a geographical 
space divided into m jurisdictions of equal size, with local governments.   4 
is  smaller  when  the  country  is  smaller).  In  their  turn,  Dur  and  Staal  (2008)  assume 
heterogeneous regions   where each one consists of two districts that differ in size: a city and 
a village   to analyze local public good provision characterized by positive spillovers and find 
that the optimal lump sum tax, as well as the optimal earmarked transfer, crucially depend on 
the exact distribution of relative population sizes and spillovers effects over regions. 
We stress the matter of local jurisdictions size and its influence on the choice between 
decentralized and centralized public goods provision, particularly in the case of FRC policy. 
Considering size, we achieve different results from those of the SGT. In general, increasing 
differences in population size across regions  would lead towards the centralized solution. 
Intuitively, high variability in size leads to high variability in costs to provide the public good; 
hence, to avoid disparities in costs among regions, the centralized system appears the best. 
This  result  is  mainly  due  to  the  “cross  subsidization”  effect,  which  implies  an  implicit 
transfer across different regions in line with the Boadway and Hobson’s model (1993). Yet, 
introducing spillovers, it emerges that from a positive viewpoint decentralization should not 
be necessarily pursued only in the absence of externalities, but it depends on the relative size 
of regions. In particular, the net gain between the potential benefit of free riding behaviour 
and the effect of internalizing spillovers among different jurisdictions should be taken into 
account, as it is likely to be different for large and small local units. Indeed, decentralization 
becomes  more  attractive  at  high  spillovers  levels  for  small  regions  (and  those  with  high 
preferences for the public good), which have a larger incentive to free ride on each other’s 
policies and production costs. At the same time, large regions (and those with low preferences 
for  the  public  good)  gain  more  through  internalizing  spillovers     hence,  they  prefer 
centralization   instead of remaining autonomous and acting as a free rider, ceteris paribus.  
In  reference  to  the  heterogeneity  of  preferences,  the  traditional  argument  according  to 
which decentralization yields a higher level of surplus than does centralization if regions are 
relatively  heterogeneous  is  substantially  confirmed  (Tiebout  1956;  Buchanan  1965;  Oates 
1972), considering both kinds of policy maker (Leviathan and FRC). Yet, as in Lockwood 
(2002), we find that while conditions can be found under which this statement is true in both 
cases,  there  are  some  important  qualifications     also  considering  the  interaction  with 
spillovers. Indeed, decentralization appears to be preferable for controlling the rent seeking 
behaviour of  Leviathans not in absence of  externalities   as the “competitive federalism” 
theory  suggests     but  when  spillovers  are  present  (at  intermediate  levels),  given  high 
preference heterogeneity. In addition, when the overall preferences heterogeneity increases, 
the range of spillovers values favouring decentralization becomes wider and further regions 
with increasing preferences for the public good start to decentralize.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  outlines  the  general 
framework of the model. In Section 3, results emerging from the political decision making 
process  are  presented.  Section  4  derives  conditions  under  which  centralization  or 
decentralization is the more efficient. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 The economic framework 
 
We  propose  a  many regions  model  where  the  economy  is  divided  into  J   geographically 
distinct districts indexed by  J j ,..., 1 = , each populated by a different number of individuals   5 
( j L i ,...., 1 = ), who are heterogeneous and immobile.
7 The total population of the country is 







 ). Each citizen living in a local jurisdiction derives utility 
from the private good (
i
j x ) and the local pure public good ( j G ) provided by his/her region, in 
relation to his/her public good preference parameter:  1 0 ≤ ≤
i
j λ . Thus, the utility function of 
an inhabitant i in region  j  is:
8    
                                        






j G x U ln λ + =                                                               (1) 
 
Under a decentralized system, the budget constraint of the generic individual is as follows:  
 
                                                        1 = + j j
i
j G t x                                                                      (2) 
 
where the private good is the numerary, while  j t  represents the individual contribution   or 
price     paid  by  each  citizens  to  finance  local  public  good  provision.  Hence,  public 
expenditures are financed by a uniform head tax on local residents   as in Besley and Coate, 
(2003)   represented by  j jG t , according to the Lindahl (1919/1958) tax price mechanism.
9 
Actually, the Lindahl price allows different willingness to pay of everyone, say different 
i
j t  in 
our case. Hence, in order to avoid the individual free riding problem   since individuals are 
characterized by different willingness to pay for the public good   the level of taxation is 
assumed to be unique and identical into the same region (but different across region).  
In the case of a centralized system, a government representing all districts decides different 
level of public goods in each region,
10 but sets a uniform head tax on all citizens ( j tG ). In this 
vein, we assume a partially different budget constrain for the generic individual, where the 
same  taxation  level  is  again  considered  in  aggregate,  to  solve  the  individual  free riding 
tendency: 
 
                                                                 1 = + j
i
j tG x                                                            (2.a) 
 
                                                 
7 As Besley and Coate (2003), and Dur and Staal (2008), we ignore issues of mobility in this analysis. While 
such considerations are obviously important, incorporating them is sufficiently difficult that they are best left for 
a separate paper. 
8 Following Besley and Coate (2003) and Dur and Staal (2008), the utility function is assumed quasi linear. In 
this way, we can omit the private good consumption ( i
j x ). 
9 The Lindahl tax price is the optimal price that a consumer is willing to pay to participate in the public good 
consumption. If each person pays a customized tax price, the sum of all these can cover the marginal cost of 
providing the public good. Unfortunately, Lindahl taxation requires knowledge of the demand functions for each 
individual for all private and public goods. Hence, the main problem of this mechanism is the possibility of the 
free riding behaviour.   
10 Following Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003), it is quite unclear   from a theoretical point of view 
  why a government charged with providing public goods in a centralized system cannot differentiate the levels 
according to the heterogeneous tastes in each district. This assumption seems to be not satisfactory also on the 
empirical front. Indeed, there are many examples of goods provided unequally by a central government in a 
federal system. The case of federal highway spending in the United States illustrates this well: a significant 
fraction of funds in the Federal Highway Aid Program are earmarked by legislators for specific projects in their 
districts.   6 
The unitary cost of the public good ( j α ) is different among regions. It is a function of the 
amount  of  the  public  good  provided  in  all  regions  and  the  degree  of  intergiurisdictional 
spillovers ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ γ )
11 linked thereto:  
 


















                                             (3) 
 
where  F  is the fixed cost. When positive externalities are large (γ  is high), the production 
cost is lower. When positive externalities are small (γ  is low), the opposite situation takes 
place. As explained before, we treat external spillovers as a mechanism allowing to reducing 
production costs of the  public good provided.
12 This has a positive indirect effect on the 
individual welfare, since each person will pay less to finance the total cost of public good 
provision. 
Moreover,  the  price  fixed  by  the  decentralized  policy  maker  for  the  public  good  in 
jurisdiction  j   is  the  sum  of  all  contributions  collected  into  the  region  ( j jL t ),  and  it  is 
assumed to be equal to the unitary cost of the public good ( j α ), increased by a percentage 
( 0 ≥ j R ), which represents an extra rent for each local politician: 
 
                                                                 ( ) j j j j R L t α + = 1                                                       (4) 
 
The idea is that politicians can adopt a “full recovery costs” (FRC) strategy, setting the price 
equal to the cost of providing the public good, without any additional gains ( 0 = j R ). Hence, 
we  have  leaders  fixing:  j j jL t α = .  Otherwise,  he/she  can  adopt  a  “Leviathan”  strategy, 
charging  a  higher  price  than  the  production  cost  in  order  to  get  an  extra rent  ( 0 > j R ), 
exploiting local residents. Shortly, the price for the public good may change depending on the 
politician’s attitude.  
In addition, it is supposed to be different in the case of a centralized policy maker, who 
chooses  to  not  differentiate  inhabitants  in  terms  of  unitary  price  ( t t j = ).  In  this  case, 
politicians of all regions cooperate
13 in setting a unique tax (t) in order to cover all the costs 
and to gain an extra rent over them.  
 










1 α                                            (4.a) 
 
                                                 
11 In our model, γ  is a measure of the average spillovers effect coming from the mix of public goods provided 
by local governments. In reference to the externalities, we adopt a similar simplification to that proposed by 
Boadway and Hobson (1993) for describing the index of “publicness” of goods. Moreover, our parameter can 
give further policy intuition as different values of γ  can be associated to different kinds of public goods. Hence, 
our results on γ  give different implications depending on the nature of public goods provided.  
12 Since the overall size of the economy is fixed, the total effect of spillovers   which is over the whole national 
territory   on costs should not depend on the number of local jurisdictions in which the territory is divided. 
Equation (3) captures this idea. 
13 Under centralization,  we only focus on the cooperative solution among local politicians. Yet,  we do not 
analyze the non cooperative case as Besley and Coate (2003) do.   7 
Assumptions on the extra rent remain unchanged, with the only difference that, in this case, 
R  is unique, by definition. Thus, under centralization and FRC policy, the price is assumed to 
be equal to the cost of providing the public good ( 0 = R ); with Leviathan politician,  R  is 
greater than zero and the price is higher than the cost. In general, the price for the public good 
varies  with  the  institutional  system     centralization  versus  decentralization     and  the 
government behaviour.  
To take into account the different effects of the extra rent linked to the representative’s 
attitude, we propose an alternative specification of the budget constraint   than equation (2) 
and (2.a)   when the generic individual coincides with the rent-seeking decision maker (the 
index i becomes d ). Under a decentralized system, we have: 
 
                                                          j j j j j
d
j G R G t x α + = + 1                                                   (5) 
 
where the second term on the right hand side ( j j j G R α ) represents the additional gain of the 
opportunistic politician. On the other hand, in the case of a FRC policy, no additional gains 
( 0 = j R )  are  supposed  and  his/her  budget  constraint  is  the  same  as  that  of  equation  (2). 
Analogously, under centralization the budget constraint of no Leviathan decision maker is 
expressed by equation (2.a); for the opportunistic politician, the only differences are about 
taxation and rent, which are uniform across regions: 
 
                                                                j j j
d
j G R tG x α + = + 1                                            (5.a) 
 
2.2 The political decision-making process 
 
The political decision making process consists of four stages. First, citizens in each region 
vote on the institutional system   say, on whether to decentralize or centralize local public 
goods provision. Next, residents choose a single representative among citizens living in their 
own jurisdiction.
14 Voters elect candidates whose policy preferences yield outcomes they like, 
according to the citizens candidate approach (Besley and Coate 2003). Candidates will be 
evaluated comparing their proposals on taxes, which should be the lowest as possible for 
citizens. We assume that these proposals coincide with those setting by the policy makers in 
order  to  maximize  their  own  utility  function  in  the  third  stage.  Tax  setting  depends  on 
politicians’ different behaviour: FRC or Leviathan. Finally, in the fourth stage there is a vote 
on the amount(s) of public goods which should be provided by the decision maker in each 
region, according to the median voter theorem.  
This  decision making  structure  forms  a  game  to  be  solved  for  backward  induction. 
Therefore, we first derive the optimal level of local public goods according to the median 
voter theorem under both decentralized and centralized systems. Next, assuming different 
behaviours   “benevolent” and rent seeking   of the elected representatives, we analyze their 
influence in determining the individual tax burden to finance local public goods. Turning to 
the voting stage, we solve the citizens’ selection problem of representatives, particularly when 
he/she is a Leviathan. Lastly, we compare decentralized versus centralized solution in order to 
determine which is preferred by citizens from a welfare viewpoint.  
                                                 
14 As in Besley and Coate (2003), the assumption according to which a single representative makes decisions in a 
decentralized system is a simplification trying to capture the reality that there will be a greater commonality of 
interest across sub districts than across district, even if in the real decentralized system decisions are typically 
made by legislatures consisting of elected representatives of each of the sub districts of the district.     8 
3. Solutions 
 
3.1 The level of public goods provision 
       
The optimal level of public goods is the outcome of the median voter theorem which always 
provides the politically accepted solution. In general, it is assumed that each politician   under 
both decentralization and centralization   would to get a majority voting over the alternatives 
to implement the public policy. This means that the problem solution is to choose a level of 
j G  corresponding to that preferred by the median voter in each region, given single-peaked 
individual  preferences.
15  As  in  Lockwood  (2002),  the  only  difference  between 
decentralization and centralization is that: in the former, public goods provision is funded by a 
regional head tax ( j t ); in the latter, decisions about the setting of a tax (t) to finance different 
amounts of public goods across regions are made by a single legislature. This may represent a 
kind of “partial centralization”, in particular the “centralized funding” (Lockwood 1998),
16 
where projects and policies are decided upon regionally   which implies not uniform public 
goods provision across jurisdictions but different levels according to the heterogeneous tastes 
in each district (Besley and Coate 2003)   but funded through a national tax, that is a uniform 
head tax on all citizens. 
 
Proposition 1: Whatever the level of taxation, the amount of public good provided is that 
required by the median-voter in each region. 
 
Proof:  If each citizen in region  j  could express his/her individual demand for the amount 
of the public good to be provided, he/she will maximize his/her utility function, subject to the 














= ˆ  under 
centralization.
17  Thus,  the  preferences  are  single peaked  and  the  median voter  theorem  is 
satisfied.  ■  
 
Defining  j m  equal to 
m
j λ , which is the preference of the median voter living in jurisdiction  j  
for the public good, the outcome in region  j  when the institutional system is decentralized is 
found by maximizing equation (1) with respect to  j G  subject to the budget constraint (2). The 
equilibrium level of the public good emerging from the median voter theorem is: 
 
                                                 
15 As in Besley and Coate (2003), for simplicity we assume that 
j G  is a generic public good. By this way, we can 
easily study if the conditions of the median voter theorem hold.  
16 Centralization is usually when both the decisions about which projects to fund, and the setting of a tax to fund 
them, are made by a legislature that comprised of delegates from all regions. This is the traditional way to define 
centralization (Lockwood 2002). However, there are two alternative types of partial centralization: the first is 
“centralized expenditure“, where projects are decided upon by central government, but are funded by regions; 
the second “centralized funding” above explained and adopted, to some extent, in this paper.  































U , otherwise. Thus, preferences are single-peaked.   9 





G =                                                              (6) 
 
Each regional spending is higher the stronger is the public good preference of the median 
voter  and  lower  the  higher  is  its  “price”,  represented  by  the  taxation  level  (upon  locally 
decided). 
Under centralization, the policy outcome emerges from the maximization of equation (1) 
with respect to  j G  subject to the budget constraint (2.a). Solving that yields:  
 





j =                                                           (6.a) 
 
where the meaning of  j m  is the same as before. The amount of public good provided in each 




3.2 Tax setting  
 
We focus on different policy makers’ attitude   FRC and Leviathan   when they are in office, 
and  on  different  consequences  in  terms  of  setting  taxation  to  finance  local  public  goods. 
Indeed, different behaviours of politicians determine different taxation choices. In this vein, 
we  analyze  how  individual  taxes     representing  the  required  contributions  to  finance  the 
median voter’s  amount  of  the  public  good  in  each  region     are  determined  under  both 
decentralized  and  centralized  systems.  The  general  approach  is  to  find  the  taxation  level 
which maximizes the elected representative‘s welfare. 
Under a decentralized system, the policy maker wants to maximize the constrained utility 
function calculating by substituting equation (5) into equation (1): 
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                                         (7) 
 
where  j d  is the policy maker’s preference for the public good. When the decision maker 
follows a FRC strategy,  0 = j R , and the last constraint is binding. Otherwise, when he/she is 
a Leviathan, the last constraint is not binding.  
                                                 
18 As equation (6), equation (6.a) represents a maximum point for the individual welfare. Moreover, both results 
1 ≤ = j j m tG  and  1 ≤ = j j j m G t  are consistent with the previous hypotheses: the individual income is normalized to 
1; 
j m  represents the median value of  i
j λ  such that  1 0 ≤ ≤
i
j λ .   10 
Analogously, the maximization problem of politicians who cooperate under a centralized 
system is: 
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                              (7.a) 
 
where  j d ’s are the public good preferences of the leaders of each region. As described above, 
when politicians adopt a FRC policy,  0 = R , and the second constraint is binding; while with 
a Leviathan behaviour,  0 > R , and the second constraint is not binding. 
Considering results of Proposition 1, the maximization processes of systems (7) and (7.a) 
yield the following tax solutions (Table 1).
19 In all cases, taxes negatively depend on the 
degree of externalities in public goods provision (γ ).  
 
Table 1   Tax solutions  
Politician attitude / 
Institutional system  Decentralization  Centralization 
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Proposition 2: The policy maker cannot act as a Leviathan - setting a higher taxation level 
- for high levels of spillovers. 
 
Proof: The proof strategy is to check the value of externalities for which the constraints 
become binding. In the Appendix, we demonstrate there exist critical thresholds for γ , over 
which the rent seeking solution collapse to that where costs are fully recovered.  ■ 
 
3.3 Optimal voting 
 
According to the citizen candidate approach, policy makers are elected citizens who follow 
their policy preferences when in office.  Voters elect candidates whose policy  preferences 
                                                 
19 See the Appendix for the algebra of getting solutions of Table 1.   11 
satisfy their utility functions. In other words, each candidate proposes the taxation level which 
maximizes  his/her  own  utility  function  (see  Table  1);  in  their  turn,  individuals  select  the 
candidate characterized by the public good preference ( j d ), which maximizes their welfare. 
Starting from the previous results, the maximization problem of the generic individual is: 
 








d t m m U Max
j
* ln ln 1 λ λ − + − =                                       (9) 
 
where  ( ) j d t*  is one of those in Table 1. 
 
Proposition 3: With FRC candidates, the result of voting is indifferent for citizens since 
whoever is elected, he/she will have to respect the constraints on  j G  and taxation level. This 
is true under both centralization and decentralization. 
 
Proof: Looking at FRC taxation in Table 1, it is easy to note that  j t  and t do not depend 
on  j d .  ■ 
 
With  politician  of  FRC  type  the  outcome  election  is  not  so  relevant,  as  the  elected 
representative will provide a “predetermined” public policy mix: the amount of  j G  preferred 
by the median voter and the level of taxation required by the full recovery costs condition. To 
some extent, this kind of policy maker does not really decide, but he/she only implements 
policies. 
When candidates are of Leviathan type, the election process is not indifferent. Indeed, any 
potential decision maker, characterized by his/her public good preferences ( j d ), proposes 
different taxes to finance the local public good in order to maximize his/her welfare function   
which also means to extract a rent from citizens. In their turn, residents choose the politician 
considering the announced level of taxation.  
 
Proposition 4: With Leviathan candidates, citizens unanimously vote for the candidate 
with the highest preference for the public good ( 1 = j d ). 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  ■ 
 
Intuitively, the way to moderate the rent seeking behaviour is to elect candidates with the 
highest preference for the public good. Indeed, they should reduce taxes in order to win the 
election   that is to make the median voter willing to accept a bigger amount of the public 
good.   
 
 
4. The choice of institutional system: decentralization versus centralization 
 
The final stage of the political decision making process is the choice between decentralization 
and centralization. In each region, there is a vote on whether to coordinate each other and to 
consolidate  decisions  into  one  single  authority     a  centralized  system     or  to  remain 
autonomous and favour decentralized local public goods provision. In other words, given the   12 
outcome of the policy makers emerging from the previous steps, citizens have to assess the 
relative efficiency of both systems selecting one which provides a higher level of utility.  
As we demonstrated before, the individual utility function is decreasing with the level of 
taxation defined by the politician. Thus, each person will compare different “tax rate” and 
vote for the institutional setting where he/she pays less. The politician behaviour   which 
determines the level of taxation   and the degree of external spillovers represent key elements 
to compare the convenience of either institutional system. In reference to the last issue, the 
tradition theory (i.e., Oates 1972) suggests that, with identical districts and policy uniformity, 
decentralization  dominates  when  interregional  spillovers  are  small;  centralization,  when 
spillovers are large. However, Besley and Coate (2003) show that, with identical and non 
identical  districts  under  a  cooperative  legislature,  decentralization  is  still  better  when 
externalities are small, but what happens when spillovers are high is less clear: “The only 
nuance here is that we cannot show that there exists a critical level of spillovers in the case of 
heterogeneous district”. This reflects the fact that the gain in surplus from centralization is not 
necessarily everywhere increasing in the size of externality (Lockwood 2002).  
In our model   where “policy uniformity” is not exogenously assumed   the following 
elements can be identified and should be taken into account to compare centralized versus 
decentralized solution, given different policy makers behaviours (Leviathan or FRC): 
 
i)  the implicit transfers (“cross subsidization”) across different regions; 
ii)  the free riding gains in receiving positive externalities;  
iii)  the gains of internalizing externalities; 
iv)  the degree of preferences heterogeneity. 
 
4.1 The Leviathan behaviour: decentralization versus centralization  
 
When the policy makers are rent seeking, they try to extract an extra rent from taxation unless 
the externalities are high, as we have proved in Proposition 2. In this case, the taxes proposed 
by the elected politicians (Table 2) can be redefined from those reported in Table 1, assuming 
1 = j d  according to Proposition 4. 
 
Table 2   Leviathan taxation 
 



























































 are the arithmetic and geometric mean of the regional 
preferences of the median voters, respectively. The ratio 
Θ
M
 is an index which increases with 
the overall heterogeneity of preferences.  
From Table 2, we can  note that both kinds of  taxation are dependent  on the preferences 
parameter ( j m  and  M ). In general, we can anticipate that the choice of the institutional   13 
system  is  determined  by  the  relationship  among  regional  preferences,  the  degree  of 
preferences heterogeneity and an index of internalization. Indeed, we can capture the effect of 








, which is less 
than 1 and decreasing in γ . This means that the per capita cost under centralization decreases 
faster  than  under  decentralization  because  of  the  presence  of  spillovers.  In  addition,  the 












,  which is greater than 1 and increasing in γ . Given 
a  certain  degree  of  preferences  heterogeneity,  when  externalities  increase  politicians  can 
exploit the benefits of spillovers in order to rise up their extra rent instead of reducing the per 
capita cost.  
Comparing the two taxation levels   in logarithmic form    we have that the  region  j  
prefers decentralization (
LEV LEV
j t t < ) if the following holds: 
 
                                     [ ] ( ) HM
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HM ln 0 >  (since  1 >
Θ
M
) is an index of the overall preferences heterogeneity. 
The condition is likely to be true   say, citizens of region  j  prefer decentralization   when the 
relative preference of region  j  for the public good ( M mj ln ln − ) is low; when the gain from 














1 ln 1 ln
1
J
)  is  low,  and  when  the  overall  preference 




a)  When the median-voter’s preference for the public good is lower than the average, 
there  exists  a  threshold  for  externalities,  which  changes  the  convenience  of 
decentralization versus centralization. When spillovers are lower than the threshold, 
regions prefer decentralization. Otherwise, centralization.     
b)  When the median-voter’s preference for the public good is higher than the average, 
three cases may appear: 
1.  Regions  always  prefer  centralization  when  the  overall  preferences 
heterogeneity (HM ) is low.  
2.  When  the  overall  preferences  heterogeneity  is  high,  regions  prefer 
decentralization  only  for  intermediate  levels  of  externalities.  Otherwise,  for 
very low and very high degree of spillovers, regions prefer centralization. 
3.   When the overall preferences heterogeneity increases, the range of spillovers 
values favouring decentralization becomes wider. In addition, further regions 
with increasing preferences for the public good start to decentralize. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  ■ 
   14 
Intuitively,  for  regions  with  preferences  lower  than  the  average,  the  centralized  solution 
implies higher taxation   and higher costs   when externalities are low or absent. Indeed, for γ  
equal to zero, the centralized tax represents the average of those decentralized. Thus, in a 
centralized system these regions should pay more for providing the public good to regions 
with  higher  preferences.  When  externalities  are  absent,  following  this  logic,  regions  with 
preferences  higher  than  the  average  vote  for  centralization.  This  means  that  there  is  an 
implicit transfer (“cross subsidization”) from regions with low preferences for the public 
good to regions with high ones. On the other hand, when externalities are very high the gain 
from internalization overcome the benefits of decentralization. These  results appear to be 
quite standard.  
New  findings  emerge  from  part  (b)     point  2  and  3     of  Proposition  5.  Indeed, 
decentralization can be suitable for controlling the rent seeking behaviour of Leviathans not 
in absence of externalities   as the “competitive federalism” theory suggests (Salmon 1987; 
Breton 1987)   but when spillovers are present (at intermediate levels) since the centralized 
politician partially exploits the gain of internalization in order to rise up his/her extra rent 
instead of reducing taxation.  
 
4.2 The FRC policy: decentralization versus centralization  
 
When politicians adopt the FRC strategy, the taxes proposed (Table 3) can be redefined from 
those reported in Table 1 after some algebra: 
 
Table 3   Full recovery costs taxation 
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 is the average size of regions, while  M and Θ  are the same as before. We 







ω . It represents the gross mark up on variable costs 
( F L m j j − ) in the region  j  necessary to perform public expenditure   say, financing the 
public good   equal to the average spending of all regions ( L Mˆ ).
20 The higher the average 
expenditure and fixed costs, the higher the mark up; while the higher the expenditure in the 
region  j  ( j jL m )   say, high values of  j m  and  j L    the lower the mark up required. Given 
                                                 
20 The mark up 
j ω  is equal to the mark up on variable costs of region  j  to cover the total costs of public good 
provision  times  the  ratio  between  the  average  expenditure  of  all  regions  and  the  expenditure  of  region  j : 












= ω .   15 






























ω  are the harmonic and geometric mean of the gross 
mark up,  respectively.
21  Both  taxation  levels  inversely  depend  on  summary  measures  of 
regional preferences (M  for 
FRC
j t  and  Θ  for 
FRC t , respectively) and directly on those of the 
gross mark up (Γfor 
FRC
j t  and   for 
FRC t , respectively).  
In this vein, we introduce two indicators of heterogeneity in order to easily compare the 




, which increases with the variance in preferences; the latter describes the 
heterogeneity in mark up, 
 
Γ
,  which increases with the variance in preferences and with the 
variability of local size ( j L ). Hence, the choice between centralization and decentralization is 
mainly  determined  by  these  two  indexes  of  heterogeneity,  given  different  values  of 
externalities (γ ). 
Considering the logarithmic form of solutions of Table 3, region  j  prefers decentralization 
(
FRC FRC
j t t < ) if the following is verified: 
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= ln ω H ,
22 maintaining the same 
properties above described.  
Starting from the right hand term, we have the following:  
 
Proposition  6:  Increasing  differences  in  population  size  across  regions  would  lead 
towards the centralized solution; while with increasing heterogeneity of preferences, regions 
prefer decentralization. 
 
Proof: The proof is straightforward.  ■ 
 
Equation (11) is likely to be false when the variability of regional size grows up, contributing 
to increase the  ω H  indicator, ceteris paribus. Following this logic, centralization is preferred 
when regions are quite  different in size.  Intuitively, high variability in size leads to high 
variability in costs to provide the public good, where smaller jurisdictions suffer higher costs 
                                                 
21 Since the harmonic mean is always lower than the geometric mean, the ratio  1 <
Γ
   and it is decreasing with 
the heterogeneity of the gross mark up. This index will be useful to compare the two institutional systems. 
22 The index  ω H  is greater than 0, since  1 >
 
Γ .    16 
and  mark up.  Hence,  to  avoid  disparities  in  costs  among  regions,  the  centralized  system 
appears to be the best solution (“cross subsidization”).
23  
In reference to preferences heterogeneity, it is easy to show that the increasing variability 
in preferences has two effects: a direct effect, implying an increase of the  HM index which 
contributes to verify equation (11) and confirm the traditional argument according to which 
with  a  high  degree  of  preferences  heterogeneity  the  chance  of  decentralizing  is  likely  to 
increase. Yet, the indirect effect concerns the increase of mark up heterogeneity ( ↑ ω H ) due 
to the high variability in preferences. This favours the convenience of  centralization than 
decentralization.  Consistently  with  the  mainstream,  we  can  assume  that  the  direct  effect 
prevails  over  the  indirect  one,  promoting  decentralization.  In  this  sense,  the  traditional 
findings (Tiebout 1956; Buchanan 1965; Oates 1972), according to which with benevolent 
policy makers   similar, to some extent, to our politicians implementing the FRC strategy   the 
decentralized  solution  dominates  when  individuals’  preferences  are  heterogeneous  across 
local jurisdictions, are confirmed.  
Observing the left hand side, we have the following: 
 
Proposition  7:  The  centralized  system  is  preferred  by  smaller  regions  and  those  with 
preferences for the public good higher than the average. 
 
Proof: Equation (11) is likely to be false   citizens of region  j  prefer centralization   when 
regions are small which means their relative mark up (
 
j ω
ln ) is high. Indeed, smaller regions 
have  to  pay  higher  per  capita  costs,  so  they  prefer  centralization  (“cross  subsidization” 
argument). When the preference for the public good is higher than the average (
M
m j ln  is 
high), two effects occur: a direct effect which leads towards centralization; an indirect one 
according to which higher preferences imply lower mark up, and thus decentralization. We 
assume that the direct effect is stronger than the indirect one, favouring so centralization. As 
in the Leviathan case, under centralization regions characterized by higher preferences for the 
public good receive implicit transfers from regions with lower preferences.  ■ 
 
Moreover, looking at the externalities we have the following: 
 
Proposition 8: Suppose that median-voter’s preference for the public good is lower than 
the  average  and  regions  are  large  -  their  mark-up  is  lower  than  the  average  -















). Then:  
 
a)  Regions  always  prefer  decentralization  when  the  right  hand  term  is  positive 
( 0 > − ω H HM ). 
b)  When the right hand term is negative ( 0 < − ω H HM ), there exists a threshold level 
for  externalities:  below  the  threshold,  regions  prefer  decentralization;  over, 
centralization. 
 
Proof: see the Appendix.  ■ 
                                                 
23 This result is consistent with that of Boadway and Hobson (1993).   17 
 
The quite standard result here obtained is not general. Large jurisdictions and those with low 
preferences for the public good would like decentralization. The crucial point is that, in this 
case, the effect of “cross subsidization” is negative; hence, these regions have to pay implicit 
transfers when taxation is centralized. Under decentralization, large municipalities can self 
finance, even without any external spillovers to exploit. To some extent, we may conclude 
that public goods provision may be efficiently decentralized only if regions are large enough, 
ceteris  paribus.  When  spillovers  increase,  those  regions  internalize  spillovers  instead  of 
remaining autonomous.  That is to say they prefer to  gain  form internalization, losing the 
advantages of free riding. This is true when disparities in size are very high ( 0 < − ω H HM ). 
 
Proposition 9: Suppose that median-voter’s preference for the public good is higher than 
the  average  and  regions  are  small  -  their  mark-up  is  higher  than  the  average  - 















). Then:  
 
a)  Regions  always  prefer  centralization  when  the  right  hand  term  is  negative 
( 0 < − ω H HM ). 
b)  When the right hand term is positive ( 0 > − ω H HM ), there exists a threshold level 
for  externalities:  below  the  threshold,  regions  prefer  centralization;  over, 
decentralization. 
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  ■ 
 
To  summarize,  the  advantages  of  free riding  may  be  asymmetric  for  regions  differing  in 
preferences and size   as in Kanbur and Keen’s (1993)   and also offset the benefits of the 
internalization of externalities, favouring unexpected solutions in terms of centralized versus 
decentralized provision of local public goods. The intuition behind this result is as follows. 
Smaller  regions  and  those  with  high  preferences  for  the  public  good  would  prefer  the 
centralized solution, because through it they try to charge other regions for some costs of 
production. In a broad sense, this result could justify that such municipalities would prefer 
monetary  transfers  from  the  State,  rather  than  autonomously  deciding  their  fiscal  policy. 
When beneficial spillovers increase, these regions may find more suitable a decentralized 
system since they can exploit   without costs   positive externalities provided by other regions 
as a free rider. The free riding behaviour can be convenient when preferences heterogeneity is 
high ( 0 > − ω H HM ).  
In general, we may conclude that when the politician does not act as a Leviathan   that is, 
he/she  exactly  sets  taxes  to  cover  the  cost  of  providing  public  goods     the  argument  of 
whether decentralization or centralization is more suitable also depends on the size of local 
jurisdictions,  not  only  on  regional  preferences  and  the  extent  of  spillovers.  Neither  the 
institutional systems appear to be universally valid for all regions. 
Our propositions suggest that some regions “move” from centralization to decentralization 
when externalities increase, challenging the traditional results (i.e., Oates 1972), according to 
which the centralized solution is the best when spillovers are maximal, while decentralization 
is better when there are no inter jurisdictional externalities. Even Besley and Coate (2003) 
show that (with a cooperative legislature) for both   identical and heterogeneous   districts, 
decentralization  dominates  centralization  for  low  levels  of  spillovers,  while  centralization 
dominates for high levels of spillovers. However, they cannot demonstrate that there exists a   18 
critical value of externalities in the case of heterogeneous districts, confirming that there is no 
general presumption that the relative performance of centralization is always increasing in 
spillovers. Lockwood (2002) also affirms that the gain in surplus from centralization is not 
necessarily everywhere increasing in the size of externality.
24 
The  key  insight  of  our  results  is  represented  by  different  size  of  regions,  which  may 
determine an asymmetry among citizens’ responses about the best institutional setting. Thus, 
we obtain findings partially consistent with Besley and Coate’s (2003), but we propose the 
trade off between free riding and internalization   not considered in the previous literature   to 
compare centralized versus decentralized system. From a positive viewpoint, decentralization 
should not be necessarily pursued only in the absence of externalities, but also with high 
spillovers. This is true only for small regions and those with higher preferences for the public 
good, where the free riding gains overcome the benefits of internalizing spillovers. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
We have developed a model to study local public goods provision characterized by positive 
spillovers, adopting a political economy approach. In general, the standard result suggests that 
decentralization is not efficient when there are positive spillovers (Tiebout 1956; Buchanan 
1965; Oates 1972). However, recent contributions (Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003) 
show that, under certain political conditions   for example, with a cooperative legislature   the 
familiar presumption that centralization emerges only with higher spillovers is not confirmed 
since it can be chosen also for low spillovers degree. 
Starting from these findings, we propose a partially different framework where modelling 
the  detail  of  political  decision making  is  important  to  understand  the  trade off  between 
centralization and decentralization. One key feature of the paper is to focus on two relevant 
aspects neglected by the political economy models: the size of local jurisdictions (which is 
relevant for the scale effect in the financing mechanism of non rival public goods) and the 
explicit definition of the rent seeking behaviour, representing the additional gain of Leviathan 
politicians through the “extra-rent” equation. Moreover, modelling interregional externalities 
as  a  mechanism  contributing  to  lowering  the  production  cost  of  the  public  good  in  each 
region,  a  quite  different  trade off     from  the  FGT  and  the  SGT  of  fiscal  federalism     is 
proposed  in  order  to  compare  decentralized  versus  centralized  solution:  the  gains  from 
internalizing externalities and the losses of free-riding advantages, which may differ with the 
size of regions and their preferences for the public good. 
In short, the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon 
spillovers extent and differences in tastes for public spending, but for different reasons than 
those  suggested  in  the  existing  literature.  In  addition,  a  key  insight  is  represented  by 
disparities in regional size and the index of heterogeneity linked thereto. In detail, without 
assuming policy uniformity (as Lockwood 2002, and Besley and Coate 2003), we identify the 
following  factors,  which  interact  to  determine  the  choice  between  decentralization  and 
centralization, when policy makers are Leviathan and FRC type, respectively: 
 
i)  the free riding gains exploiting positive externalities;  
ii)  the gains of internalizing externalities; 
iii)  the degree of preferences heterogeneity; 
iv)  the “cross subsidization” across different regions 
                                                 
24 In particular, he shows that this is related to the non monotonicity of project funding as net spillovers increase.   19 
 
where  the  net  benefit  of  the  first  two  items  is  substantially  different  for  large  and  small 
regions.  
In  general,  we  can  affirm  that  increasing  differences  in  population  size  across  regions 
would lead towards the centralized solution; while increasing heterogeneity of preferences to 
decentralization.  This  is  especially  true  when  politicians  adopt  a  FRC  strategy.  To  some 
extent,  the  last  finding  is  quite  consistent  with  the  tradition  theory  of  fiscal  federalism 
according  to  which  “the  welfare  gain  from  the  decentralized  provision of  particular  local 
public good becomes greater as the diversity of individual demands within the country as a 
whole increases” (Oates, 1972).  
However, considering spillovers effects and different size of local jurisdictions allow better 
qualifying  these  results.  Indeed,  neither  the  institutional  systems  appear  to  be  universally 
valid: for small regions and those with higher preferences for the public good, for example, 
the  free riding  gains  overcome  the  benefits  of  internalizing  spillovers,  favouring 
decentralization,  when  beneficial  spillovers  increase.  In  other  words,  from  a  positive 
viewpoint,  decentralization  should  not  be  necessarily  pursued  only  in  the  absence  of 
externalities, but also with high spillovers and some regions “move” from centralization to 
decentralization when externalities increase. At the same time, large jurisdictions and those 
with  low  preferences  for  the  public  good  would  like  decentralization  only  without  any 
external spillovers to exploit; while, when spillovers increase, they internalize spillovers   
centralization   getting more from internalization than from free riding.  
Finally,  new  results  also  emerge  with  Leviathan  decision  makers.  In  this  case,  the 
“dimension” of public good preferences plays a crucial role. Indeed, decentralization seems to 
be suitable for regions with higher preferences for the public good to control the rent seeking 
behaviour of Leviathans not in absence of externalities but when spillovers are present   at 
intermediate  levels     and  preferences  heterogeneity  is  high.  Under  centralization,  citizens 
would pay more since the centralized opportunistic politician would partially exploit the gain 
of internalization to rise up his/her extra rent instead of reducing taxation. Following this 
logic, when the overall preferences heterogeneity increases, the range of spillovers values 
favouring decentralization becomes wider, and further regions (with increasing preferences 
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Appendix 
 
The algebra of tax solutions (Table 1) 





G =  (where  j t  is equal to t under centralization), sets 
taxation in order to maximize his/her utility function subject to the budget constraint which 
depends on his/her opportunistic behaviour. Thus: 
 
￿  Decentralization 
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When the constraint is binding, we have the FRC solutions solving the constraint. Otherwise, 
we have the Leviathan solutions maximizing the utility function. 
 
a)  FRC taxation 
 































This equation is the taxation reaction function of the elected policy maker of jurisdiction 
j  with respect to the taxation policy of other regions. Obviously, the taxation reaction 





























Comparing  the  two,  we  have  the  ratio  between  taxes  of  two  different  regions.  Then, 























































































































b)  Leviathan taxation 
 
Maximizing the utility function, we have: 
 






















































































































































































When FOC holds, SOC is negative:       
 
0 1 2


































Thus, when the constraint is not binding we have a maximum solving FOC, which also 
represents  the  taxation  reaction  function  of  region  j .  Taking  the  taxation  reaction 










t = . Substituting into the 








































































1    22 

































t C  
 
 
￿  Centralization 





j =  and simplifying, we 
have: 
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When the constraint is binding, we have the FRC solutions solving the constraint. Otherwise, 
we have the Leviathan solutions maximizing the joint utility function. 
 
a)  FRC taxation 
 
Solving the constraint, we have:  
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b)  Leviathan taxation 
 
Maximizing the joint utility function, we have: 
 
FOC        ( ) 0 1
1
1 1
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When FOC holds, SOC is negative:    
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Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Let us consider the decentralized taxation of Leviathan. Substituting this solution into the 
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Setting  F   small  enough,  so  that  1 > − F L m j j ,  it  is  a  sufficient  condition  to  have 
1 <
− F L m
d
j j
j . Thus, this equation cannot hold when γ  increases. The analytical steps for the 





















Also in this case, this equation cannot hold when γ  increases. 
In  other  words,  when  externalities  increase,  the  constraints  may  become  binding  and 
Proposition 2 is proved.  ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
 
Substituting the Leviathan taxation into the maximization problem of the generic citizen, we 
obtain the following FOCs:  
 






















































That is to say the individual utility is always increasing in  j d . The corner solution is  1 = j d  
in both cases.  
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Proof of Proposition 5 
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￿  Case a):                
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 and increases in γ . Moreover: 
[ ] −∞ = −
−










→ M m j γ
γ
γ  





















1 1 ln 1 ln
1
lim

























































M m j , equation (10) is true. 























M m j , equation (10) is false. 
 
For continuity, Proposition 5, case a) is proved.  ■ 
 
￿  Case b):            
 




M m j γ
γ
 and decreases in γ . Moreover: 
[ ] +∞ = −
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M m j , equation (10) is false. 























M m j , equation (10) is false. 
 
Hence, the left hand side has a minimum. 
If  HM  is lower than the minimum value, case b.1) holds. Otherwise, case b.2) and b.3) 
hold.  
Hence, Proposition 5, case b) is proved.  ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 8 
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￿  The proof of case a) is straightforward. 
￿  In the case b), the left hand side is increasing in γ  and:  
 
































































This proves the case b).  
 
Hence, Proposition 8 is proved.  ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 9 
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￿  The proof of case a) is straightforward. 
￿  In the case b), the left hand side is decreasing in γ  and:  
 
































































This proves the case b).  
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